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This paper is concerned with the interaction between trade policies and the protection
of Intellectual Property Rights ( IPRs). In particular, it investigates the welfare
implications of an international agreement on one or both policy instruments. The
main insights are first, that both sets of policies are substitutes and second, that they
are affected by the same Prisoner's Dilemma problem. As a consequence, an
agreement in both policy instruments is needed to achieve any positive welfare gains,
which supports the long standing claim of policy makers from developed countries
that protection of IPRs should be included in multilateral trade agreements.
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 I. Introduction
Economists have long extolled the virtues of free trade. Besides the static welfare
gains from specialization according to comparative advantage, it has been argued that
trade generates dynamic gains by facilitating international knowledge spillovers,
reducing research redundancy and providing access to a wider range and cheaper
intermediate and capital goods
1. These theoretical arguments are further supported by
an impressive body of empirical evidence.
2 Yet, despite the significant reduction in
worldwide tariff levels achieved through several rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), many
barriers to trade still exist in the world trading system. Especially worrying for
supporters of the free trade cause is the breakdown of the recent attempt to launch a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) at the Seattle meeting. Arguably, one of the main reasons for the slowdown of
trade negotiations is the growing lack of consensus between developed and
developing countries on the agenda of the negotiations. Indeed, ever since the
Uruguay Round of GATT, developed countries have tried to push many issues on the
agenda on the grounds that these issues were "trade related". Of these issues, only a
few, most notably the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), have led to the
signature of an agreement in the context of multilateral trade negotiations. Yet, even
as far as the protection of  IPRs is concerned, no theoretical consensus has been
reached as to whether and how its exclusion from the agenda of trade negotiations
                                                                
1 For seminal contributions see Ethier (1982), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Grossman and Helpman
(1991a) and (1991b). For more recent works see e.g. Baldwin and Seghezza (1996), Van and Wan
(1997), Goh and Olivier (2001).
2 See for examples, Harrison (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999) and Bayoumi et. al. (1999).2
could constitute an impediment to freer trade. With this gap in the trade literature, it is
even more difficult to assess whether other more controversial issues such as labor
and environmental standards are "trade-related". The objective of this paper is to fill
this gap and to answer the question as to whether and why the protection of IPRs
constitutes a "trade-related" issue.
IPRs protection was added to the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations at the request of the developed countries in 1986. At that time, IPRs were
under the jurisdiction of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a UN
agency that overseas the international agreements on  IPRs such as the Paris
Convention (on patents) and the  Berne Convention (on copyrights). The Paris
Convention required member states to apply identical criteria to foreign and domestic
firms, but did not prescribe specific levels of patent protection. The fact that  IPRs
protection varied widely across countries led developed countries to seek an
international agreement on IPRs protection under GATT, on the grounds that weak
protection of IPRs distorts natural trading patterns and acts as an impediment to free
trade. An agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) was finally concluded in Marrakesh in 1994. Under the  TRIPs agreement
member countries are required to provide for and to enforce certain minimum
standards of IPRs protection. Members' compliance with the agreement is monitored
by a  TRIPs Council and dispute settlement takes place under the WTO dispute
settlement procedures.
The policy debate about  TRIPs motivated several careful analyses of the
implication of IPRs protection for innovation and welfare. Chin and Grossman (1988)3
analyzed a model whereby all innovation takes place in the North and all imitation
takes place in the South and found that it is generally not in the interest of the South to
protect Northern intellectual property. Diwan and  Rodrik (1991) assumed that the
South differs from the North in their preference for certain technologies and showed
that the South may want to protect Northern intellectual property to facilitate the
invention of technologies appropriate to the South. Finally, Helpman (1993) pointed
out in a general equilibrium model that it is possible for Northern innovation to slow
down with stricter IPRs protection in the South and that stricter IPRs protection may
hurt both the North and the South.  However, all these paper share a common
denominator in that they all cast their analyses under the assumption of free trade in
the goods market. Hence, they can examine only the desirability of IPRs protection
per se and not whether IPRs protection is a "trade-related issue".  To address that
question indeed, we believe that it is necessary to cast the analysis in a world where
trade regimes are endogenous. In other words, we need a model where countries
choose optimally both the level of IPRs protection and the level of trade barriers.
We investigate the issue in a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model
where growth is driven by product innovation. Each country has a research sector and
a manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector produces goods invented by the
local research sector. Consumers are assumed to have a "preference for variety". Each
country exercises a choice over the level of tariffs to impose on imports as well as the
stringency of IPRs protection to grant to innovators, both home and foreign. On the
one hand, lower IPRs protection and higher tariffs both reduce the profits of firms and
hence the innovation rate at the equilibrium. On the other hand, lower IPRs protection
implies lower prices of goods while higher tariffs implies higher lump sum transfers4
from tariff revenue, both of which increase real expenditure of consumers. We show
the existence of a Prisoner's Dilemma in the setting of optimal  IPRs and tariff
policies; while world welfare is maximized when all countries enforce maximum
patent protection and practice free trade, individual countries have incentives to free
ride on other countries by lowering patent protection and/or impose trade tariffs. We
also show that these incentives are increasing in the number of countries in the world.
More importantly, we show that tariffs and patent protection are substitute policies.
The implication is that even if countries sign a binding agreement fixing the level of
one policy instrument, countries have the incentives and the possibility to change the
policy instrument that is at their free disposal to reach the same equilibrium allocation
as they would get without any international agreement. Only cooperation on  both
policy instruments solves the Prisoner's Dilemma problem and is Pareto improving.
The conclusion is that countries have no incentives to enter a trade agreement unless
there is also an agreement on IPRs protection. Thus, the model adds direct support to
the claim by developed countries that the failure to enforce minimum international
standards in IPRs protection acts as a barrier to further trade liberalization.
This paper is not alone in looking at the impact of domestic policies on the
outcome of multilateral trade agreements. Copeland (1990) first showed that trade
agreements can be beneficial even if there exist other policy instruments which are
non-negotiable. More recently a very active strand of literature has focused on the
desirability of including labor and environmental standards on the WTO agenda (see
e.g. Bhagwati and Hudec 1996 or Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Our analysis shares
some common factors with this literature, most notably the modeling of trade policy
as a multi-stage game between governments. However, an important difference is that5
our analysis is cast in a dynamic general equilibrium framework while the existing
literature has restricted itself to a static analysis. This feature of our model is
necessary for our purposes, as one can hardly discuss IPRs protection policies without
considering their impact on innovation and growth. In addition, our model allows us
to discuss the dynamic effects of multilateral trade agreements, which complements
the existing literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we set up the model. In
section III we derive optimal tariffs and patent protection and compare the welfare
levels under a) binding international agreements in both policy instruments, b) no
binding agreement in either policy instrument and c) binding international agreement
in one policy instrument. Section IV concludes.
II. The Model
We consider a world populated by N symmetric countries. Total world population
is constant over time and of measure 1. Each country produces a range of final
consumption goods invented by local researchers and all goods are tradable. The
range of goods produced in each country increases over time through investment in
R&D. There is no uncertainty in the R&D process. The utility function of a
representative household in each country is of the Dixit-Stiglitz type, exhibiting a
taste for variety. There is only one primary factor, labor, that can be used to undertake
research or to produce goods. Each country exercises a choice over the level of tariffs
and patent protection to implement.6
In this section we solve for the balanced growth path given the level of tariffs and
patent protection. We solve for optimal policies in the next section.
Households
In each country there exists a measure 1/N of identical households. Households are
infinitely lived and are endowed with a constant flow of labor L. They can borrow or
lend freely at the instantaneous, risk-free, interest rate r(t). Following Grossman and









subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint. r is the subjective discount rate
and Di(t) represents an index of consumption at time t.
We adopt for D the Dixit and Stiglitz (1979) specification that imposes the same
constant elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods. Specifically,
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where yij denotes consumption of design j by a household in country i and [0,m(t)] is
the range of final products existing in the world at time t.
Let Ei denote total expenditure of all households in country i. Since each country
has a measure 1/N of identical households, the expenditure of one household is given7
by NEi.
3 Given that all firms from the same country j charge the same price pij to
consumers in country i, it is straightforward to show that each household in country i
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units of design j, where pij is the price of good design j sold in country i, mk(t) is the
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products.
It is well known that the solution to the consumer problem satisfies:
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where ri(t) is the prevailing market interest rate in country i.
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We finally assume that there is perfect international capital mobility, which implies
that the interest rate must equalize across countries. This together with equation (5)
implies that:
ri(t)= r       for all i and t. (6)
                                                                
3 We keep the world population constant as we vary the number of countries so that our results are not
affected by the scale effect associated with the type of endogenous growth model we use in this paper.8
Production
Each country has a manufacturing and a research sector. New good designs are
created in the research sector and then produced in the manufacturing sector. For
simplicity, we assume that the inventor of a good design must necessarily locate the
production of that design in his own country. However, as will be made clear later on
in the paper, the design may also be produced by foreign imitators. We choose units
so that each unit of consumption good is produced using one unit of labor. 
The number of good designs produced in each country can be increased by
undertaking research, which uses labor as its sole input. Following Romer (1990) we
assume that the productivity of a researcher increases as the society accumulates more
ideas, represented by the number of products previously invented. We assume that
knowledge spillovers are international in scope so that researchers in each country
benefit from knowledge accumulation in all the other countries in the world. Also, as
long as no country pursues an autarky policy, there will be no duplication of research
effort since it is always more profitable to invent a unique product (Rivera-Batiz and




) t ( m





We assume that all goods produced are tradable and that there is no transport cost.
The government in each country  i can choose the level of  ad valorem tariff ti to
impose on imports. If the external price is q, then domestic consumers face a price
equal to (1+ti)q. In the absence of prohibitive tariffs, all goods produced abroad will9
be imported since consumers' utility function exhibits a taste for variety. We make the
following assumption regarding tariff policy.
Assumption 1
Tariffs are set at time 0 and remain constant through time.
Assumption 1 is a natural assumption to make since in this paper, we concern
ourselves with stationary equilibria only. We make the assumption so as to abstract
away from the possibility of dynamic games between the two countries.
4
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
We assume that the government in each country can exercise a choice over the type of
patent protection to be granted to any innovator who files for the protection.
5 An
innovator of a product has to file for patent protection in every country in which the
good is being sold since the enforcement of the patent lies within the jurisdiction of
the consuming country. Also we assume that the same protection applies to all sales
within a country, regardless of whether the sales originate from foreign or domestic
firms.
6 Once granted the patents, the innovator can either produce and sell the good on
his own or sell the patents to another domestic firm, which then becomes the
exclusive producer of the invented product. We assume that there are a large number
of firms that bid for the patents so that regardless of the option chosen by the
innovator, he will eventually get all the profits generated by his patents. Since each
variety of consumption good can be sold in all the countries, the profits of each
                                                                
4 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 5, p. 145-203.
5 In this paper we use the term "patent protection" and "IPRs protection" interchangeably as patent
protection is the type of protection of relevance for industrial innovation.
6 This is consistent with the TRIPs agreement in WTO and the Paris Convention. We leave the analysis10
innovator and hence the incentive to innovate will depend on the patent protection
granted by all the countries combined.
In general, there are two dimensions on which the patent protection could operate:
patent length and patent breadth. In this paper we assume that the patent once granted
is infinitely-lived. This assumption can be defended on three grounds. First, Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) showed in a partial equilibrium setting that infinite patent length
generally is socially optimal and that the appropriate margin on which patent policy
should operate on is patent breadth. Second, empirical evidence shows that, most of
the time, patents are infringed upon or become obsolete long before the end of their
legal life (e.g. Mansfield, 1984 and 1985). This suggests that patent breadth and
stringency of enforcement are the dimensions of patent protection that matter the most
in practice. Third, the assumption of infinite patent length allows us to address the
questions we pose in this paper in a very tractable manner.
Since the patent life is infinite, the amount of protection granted by the patent and,
thus, the amount of profits reaped by the innovator, solely depend on the patent
breadth
7. Patent breadth matters as we assume the existence of a competitive sector in
each country that can locally imitate existing good designs at a constant per unit cost
of imitation. Thus, the optimal pricing strategy of a patentee in a given market is to
charge a price no larger than the cost of imitation of the competitive fringe in that
market in order to discourage potential imitators from competing with his product
8.
The cost of imitation is in turn determined by the strictness of prevailing patent laws
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of asymmetric protection to future work.
7 In this paper, we take "patent breadth" to mean both patent breadth per se and the stringency with
which the patent laws are enforced.
8 Hence, there is no production by the competitive sector at the equilibrium.11
and enforcement. Smaller breadth of protection reduces the (technical or legal) costs
of imitation and hence the price received by the innovator.
9  Thus, as in Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990)
10, we may parametrize the patent breadth by the maximum price that
the innovator can charge under the protection of the patent:
Definition 1: Let  mbe the monopoly mark-up for each variety of consumption good
and  wi be the wage rate in country i. We say that country  i implements a patent
breadth equal to bi ˛ [0, 1] iff the maximum price that firms can charge to consumers
in country i is equal to wi (1 + bi  m).
We define mi ” bi  m. (8)
Assumption 2
Patent breadths are set at time 0 and remain constant over time.
To rephrase Definition 1, a patent breadth of 0 corresponds to the case where the
competitive fringe can imitate and produce at the same unit cost as the patentee. A
positive patent breadth implies that the unit cost of the competitive fringe is greater
than one (in terms of labor units) and hence the patentee is able to charge a price
higher than its unit cost, which allows him to earn a positive profit to cover the cost of
innovation. For convenience, we assume that the maximum patent protection possible
(b=1) implies a unit cost of imitation such that the innovator firms are able to charge
the monopoly mark up in the absence of tariffs.
11 In the presence of tariffs, foreign
                                                                
9 We can think of patent breadth either as affecting the additional unit costs, which the imitators need to
incur to add extra features to the product so as to avoid infringing on the patent, or as affecting the
(expected) unit costs incurred by the imitators if they are brought to court and successfully prosecuted.
10 See also Diwan and Rodrik (1991) and Goh and Olivier (2002).
11 In reality, patent protection never provides for full monopoly (Diwan and Rodrik, 1991).12
firms' mark up is strictly less than the monopoly mark up. The assumption that patent
breadths are set at time 0 and remain constant over time is again made so as to avoid
dynamic games between countries.
Having described the trade and IPRs regimes, we now solve the firm's problem.
Firms
Given the consumers' preference, each innovator firm faces a demand function for its
product given by equation (3) in every country. Since there is a continuum of varieties
of final consumption goods, each firm chooses its price taking the denominator of
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where pji is the price charged by country i's innovator firms in country j.13
We show in the appendix
12 that for any set of tariff and IPRs protection policies
(t1, .....,tN; b 1, .....,  bN), equilibrium wages are such that  1 b j £  implies that the
constraint in (10) is binding. The solution to (10) is thus given by:
pji = pjj =(1+mj)wj  (11)
Equation (11) implies that all firms (home and foreign) charge the same price in any
given country j. Substituting (11) into the demand function (3), we find that the
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Hence each firm earns an instantaneous profit of:
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and a discounted value of profits of:
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Substituting (6) and (13) into (14), we get the discounted value of profits as a function
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where g is the rate of expansion of consumption good varieties in the whole world.
In each country i, firms may enter freely into R&D. Given the production function
of R&D (7), each new design requires a cost of wi / (Am) for its invention. Each new
                                                                
12 See the end of the proof of Proposition 1.14
invention generates a discounted value of profits given by (15). Free entry together
with constant returns to scale in research imply that the cost of inventing a new design
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with equality whenever gi > 0, where gi is the rate of innovation in country i.
We impose the following restriction on parameters to guarantee that there exists at
least one set of tariffs and patent breadths such that the rate of innovation is positive:
Assumption 3
gr > g - ) 1 ( AL (17)
We are now ready to compute the equilibrium. In this paper, we focus on balanced
growth paths, that is, on competitive equilibria such that the rate of innovation g is
constant over time and across countries. The derivation of a balanced growth path
with positive innovation rate are fairly standard is delegated to the Appendix. We
summarize the main features of the equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
Given a set of tariffs (t1, .....,tN) and a set of patent protection (b1, ....., bN), there
exists a unique balanced growth path with positive innovation iff:
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 Furthermore, the level of real expenditure of each country and the world innovation
rate at the equilibrium are given respectively by:
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Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium growth rate and the equilibrium real
expenditures as a function of the level of patent protection and of tariffs. A notable
implication of Proposition 1 is that countries can raise the level of real expenditure of
their consumers either by increasing tariffs or by lowering patent protection. This is
because higher tariffs transfer income from the rest of the world to the local
consumers while lower patent protection reduces the monopoly power of firms and
hence allow consumers to purchase goods at a lower price. However, raising tariffs
and lowering patent protection also have an adverse effect on innovation rate since, in
either case, firms earn less profits and hence have less incentives to innovate. This
trade-off will play a central role in the analysis of optimal policies in the next section.
Also note that the maximum innovation rate is obtained when all tariffs are 0 and all
patent breadths are 1. The requirement that this maximum innovation rate is positive
provides the restriction on parameters given by Assumption 3.
III International Cooperation in Trade Policy and IPRs Protection
In this section, we solve for the optimal tariffs and patent breadths for each
country and analyze the welfare implications of international cooperation in trade16
and/or  IPRs protection policies. We first derive optimal policies when countries
engage in binding international agreements in the setting of both tariff and patent
protection policies and then compare them to the case where there is no international
cooperation in either policy. Finally, we analyze the cases where there is a binding
international agreement in only one policy instrument.
Binding International Agreements in both Tariff and Patent Protection
We first solve for the optimal common tariff and patent protection in each country
given that countries choose to abide by international agreements on both tariffs and
patent protection. In the presentation of our results, we assume that countries choose
the common tariff level first and then the common patent protection. However, it can
easily be shown that reversing the timing of the setting of policies does not change the
results. We solve for the optimal policies by backward induction, first solving for
optimal patent protection given the level of tariffs and then solving for the optimal
level of tariffs given the optimal level of patent protection.
The utility of a representative agent in country i at the equilibrium is given by:
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where (20) is obtained from substituting the equilibrium level of real expenditures
(18), into equation (1).  b and t  represent the vector of tariffs and patent breadths,
respectively and  ) , ( b g t  is given by equation (19).17
Equation (20) has a nice interpretation in that the representative agent derives
utility from two sources - quantity and variety. The first two terms represent agents'
utility derived from the level of real expenditure while the last term represents the
utility derived from the increase in the variety of goods. As mentioned above, higher
tariffs (lower patent protection) increase real expenditure but reduce the innovation
rate. There are therefore two opposing effects of tariffs or patent protection on
welfare. Given the two opposing effects on welfare, optimal tariffs or patent
protection depend on which of the two effects dominate. The optimal tariff and patent
protection is found by maximizing (20) with respect to patent protection and then
tariff, given that the same levels of tariff and patent protection apply to all countries.
We solve the maximization problem in the appendix and summarize our results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2
In a symmetric equilibrium with all countries engaging in binding international
agreements in both tariff and  IPRs protection, free trade and maximum patent
protection are optimal.
Proof : See Appendix
The intuition for the result in Proposition 2 is that with cooperation in both policy
instruments, the multi-country problem reduces to that of a single closed economy
model with tariffs acting as taxes on firms' profits. It is well known that there is too
little innovation at the equilibrium of economies where endogenous growth is driven
by expansion in product variety ( Romer 1990,  Grossman and  Helpman 1991b).18
Hence, since the range of possible tariffs is assumed to be bounded below by 0 and
the range of patent protection bounded from above by 1, it is optimal to set tariffs to 0
and patent breadth to 1.
No International Agreement on Either Policy
We now analyze the case where countries are bound by no international agreement on
either tariff or patent protection level. All countries choose tariff and patent protection
simultaneously. We solve for the subgame perfect Nash  equilibria. As before, we
assume that the level of tariff is chosen first before patent protection, but we can
easily show that the same equilibrium allocations are achieved if patent breadth is
chosen first. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3
In a symmetric equilibrium without international cooperation, we have either:
i)  g=0
or:
ii) Optimal tariffs and patent protection are indeterminate. A necessary and sufficient
condition for a pair of policies (t
u, b
u) to be optimal is:
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An important implication of Proposition 3 is that keeping the tariff level fixed, the
level of optimal patent protection decreases as the number of countries in the world
increases. Similarly, keeping patent protection fixed, the optimal level of tariff
increases as the number of countries increases. These results are due to the individual
country's incentive to free ride on other countries in the provision of incentives for
innovation. As the number of markets increases, each market's contribution to firms'
profits decreases and hence each individual country's policies have less impact on the
rate of innovation. Since lower IPRs protection and/or higher tariffs increase real
expenditure of domestic consumers, individual governments have higher incentives to
lower  IPRs protection and/or raise tariffs. The final implication of the free riding
problem is given in Corollary 1: if the number of countries in the world is large
enough, there can be no growth at the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The existence of a free riding problem in IPRs protection has been pointed out
elsewhere in the literature but in a North South context whereby the South, which
imitates and does not innovate, free rides on Northern innovations. (See e.g. Diwan
and Rodrik 1991 and Yang 1998). In this paper we show that the free riding problem
is not confined to the Southern countries but can also affect Northern countries. In20
addition, we show that a free riding problem applies to tariff protection as well. That a
free riding problem arises also with respect to tariff policy has so far not been
recognized in the existing literature. In fact, contrary to the optimal tariff literature
where the optimal level of tariff gets smaller for smaller economies (Gros 1987), this
paper shows that the incentive to free ride leads to higher level of optimal tariff as a
country gets smaller. The intuition for this result is that when the number of countries
in the world is small, the dynamic losses from a lower rate of innovation resulting
from the imposition of a tariff outweigh the gains from a better terms of trade. But as
the number of countries gets larger, free riding kicks in and the terms of trade gains
increasingly outweigh the dynamic losses from a lower rate of innovation, thus raising
the incentive to impose higher tariffs. This free riding problem may explain why
countries pursue free trade agreements within a more limited set of countries (that is,
regionalism) rather than relying solely on multi-lateral trade agreements
(multilateralism) as for the latter, the free riding problem is more severe and
agreements are harder to reach.
However, the main result in Proposition 3 is the multiplicity of optimal tariffs and
patent protection policies. Both high and low tariffs are consistent with the non-
cooperative equilibrium as countries can "compensate" a lower level of tariffs by a
lower level of patent protection so as to achieve their optimal level of free-riding on
other countries. Note that this result does not mean that IPR protection and tariffs are
equivalent policies in the same sense as tariffs are equivalent to a combination of
consumption tax and a production subsidy which provides the same incentives to
every agent in the economy. Indeed, under non-discrimination,  IPRs protection
policies apply equally to local and foreign firms alike while tariffs affect only foreign21
firms. However, Proposition 3 shows that at the equilibrium, after prices and wages
have adjusted, the same allocations are obtained for a low tariff/low  IPRs protection
as for a high tariff/high  IPRs protection regime. The next section deals with the
impact of this  substituability feature on the  desirabilty of multilateral trade
agreements.
Binding International Agreement in One Policy Instrument
In this section, we assume that all the countries in the world agree to abide by a
common level of IPRs protection while retaining the freedom to set tariff level. We
also assume that countries first agree on the common level of patent protection and
then they decide on the level of tariff.
13
  We again solve for the equilibrium in the appendix and summarize our results by
the following proposition:
Proposition 4
In a symmetric equilibrium with positive innovation and with binding international
agreement on patent protection only, the welfare of each country is the same as the
equilibrium with no international cooperation.
Proof : See Appendix
Proposition 4 states that there are no welfare gains if countries cooperate on only
one policy instrument. The intuition is that tariffs and patent protection are substitute
policies in the sense that they can both be used to increase real expenditure and reduce
                                                                
13 This is a natural timing for the setting of the two policies since countries can always re-optimize after22
innovation rate. In the equilibrium without any binding international agreement, each
country decides on the optimal trade-off between increasing real expenditure and
reducing innovation rate even though there are two policy instruments to achieve this
optimal trade-off. If patent protection is fixed by international agreement, each
country is still free to choose the level of tariff so as to attain the optimal trade-off.
For instance, when countries cooperate to increase patent protection, each country
then has the incentive to increase its tariffs to increase real expenditure and reduce
innovation rate back to the equilibrium without cooperation in patent policy.
Therefore, international cooperation in patent protection results in no welfare gain
compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. There is no incentive for countries to
cooperate on  IPRs protection unless there is an international agreement on tariffs
reduction at the same time.
In a similar manner and as stated in the following proposition, we can show that
there is no welfare gain if countries cooperate on a common level of tariffs but not
patent protection. There is therefore no incentive for countries to reach international
agreements on tariff reduction unless an agreement on  IPRs protection could be
achieved at the same time.
Proposition 5
In a symmetric equilibrium with positive innovation and with binding international
agreement on tariff level only, the welfare of each country is the same as the
equilibrium with no international cooperation.
Proof: See Appendix.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the agreement on IPRs protection.23
Putting Propositions 2-5 together, we conclude that the absence of a multilateral
agreement on IPRs protection can indeed act as a hindrance to countries' willingness
to agree on further trade liberalization. Furthermore, welfare gains from cooperation
in  IPRs protection can be achieved only if it is combined with an international
agreement on trade policy.
IV Conclusion
In this paper we argued that further progress in trade liberalization cannot be
achieved without international efforts in coordinating IPRs protection. Furthermore,
even though there are welfare gains from international cooperation in IPRs protection
due to the free riding problem, such gains will not accrue unless there is international
cooperation in trade policy at the same time. Without simultaneous international
efforts in trade and IPRs policies cooperation, countries have the incentive to change
the policy instrument still at their disposal in such a way as to nullify any welfare
gains that may accrue with international cooperation in the other policy instrument.
While these results are rather extreme due to the stylized nature of the model, it seems
clear that the basic insight regarding the substitutability of trade and IPRs policies,
and therefore regarding the substantial welfare gains attainable with cooperation on
both policy instruments instead of one, would carry through in most models. Our
conclusion is that the long standing claim of policy makers from developed countries
that weak or nonexistent IPRs protection acts as a barrier to free trade was indeed
correct.24
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Proof of Proposition 1
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for any pair of countries i and k.


















































At the equilibrium, the expenditure of each country is equal to income received,
that is, the sum of capital income, labor income and tariff revenue. Capital income at
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From (12) and the assumption of unit labor cost, the total demand for labor in
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Substituting (A6) and (A7) into (A8) we have:
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Substituting equations (11) into (3), we obtain the amount of each good design j









The index of consumption or the real expenditure for each agent is obtained by
substituting (A11) and (A12) into (2):
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where g is positive iff:
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For the proof to be complete, we finally need to check that equilibrium wages are
indeed such that the constraint of the producer's problem is binding. In the absence of
constraint, producers of country i want to charge to consumers of country j a constant
mark-up, (1-g)/g, over the marginal cost, inclusive of import tariffs. Therefore the
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The inequality (A22) hold for any non-negative (ti, tj) thus completing our proof.28
Proof of Proposition 2
We divide the set of feasible policies  ) b , (t  into two regions: one region such that
0 ) b , ( g > t  and the other region such that  0 ) b , ( g = t . We first solve for optimal
policies in the first region, then in the second region and finally compare welfare in
both cases to conclude on the global optimum.
From (20), given no prohibitive tariffs, the joint maximization problem with
international cooperation in both policy instruments for the case where the innovation










































































































We assume that tariff is set first before patent breadth. Hence, taking derivative of
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Thus among the range of patent breadths such that the rate of innovation is positive,
the optimal patent breadth is the maximum patent breadth b=1.
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Since utility is strictly decreasing in tariff level, the optimal tariff is zero when
innovation is positive. The welfare level when patent breadth is 1 and tariff is 0 is
given by:
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It is straightforward to show that U(0,1) is larger than welfare with prohibitive tariffs.
We next solve for optimal policies assuming that the rate of innovation is zero. In
a symmetric equilibrium, the initial variety of goods produced by inventors in each











Since all labor is now allocated to manufacturing, the labor market clearing condition













At the symmetric equilibrium, expenditure and wages are the same across countries



















The amount of each variety consumed by the representative agent is obtained by
substituting (A31) and (A32) into (A12):
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L
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Substituting (A33) into (1), we find that welfare is the same for all  ) b , (t  such that











We need to compare (A34) to (A28) to find out whether a positive innovation rate is
optimal.
( ) [ ]







g r + -
gr
g -
+ - r + g
r
=





























) b , ( U ) 1 , 0 ( U
2 0 g
   (A35)
The term in curly bracket is positive iff:31
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From Assumption 3, we note that:
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Therefore, welfare with positive innovation is strictly larger than welfare with zero
innovation since, by the mean value theorem, it is true that:
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Optimal patent breadth and optimal tariff when countries engage in binding
agreements in both tariffs and patent protection is therefore given by 1 and 0,
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3










































































We solve for the case where tariff is set first before patent protection. Solving by
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If T i £ t , at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, all countries implement the same
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The representative agent's utility is thus independent of tariff.
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Therefore, it is not optimal to raise tariff beyond T.
                                                                
14 One can easily check that the second order condition holds.33
To conclude, optimal tariffs and patent breadths are indeterminate in the case where
positive innovation is optimal but they satisfy the following conditions:
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Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting the common level of patent breadth b* enforced by all countries into (20)
and taking the derivative w.r.t. ti:
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Let B be the patent breadth such that:
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. Hence, optimal tariff is 0.
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, hence it is never optimal to set patent breadth strictly below B.
For  [ ] 1 , B * b ˛ , the optimal tariff of each individual country is given by:
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It can easily be checked that the optimal tariff is strictly less than the prohibitive tariff.
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Furthermore, comparing (A54) with (A44), we observe that the welfare is the same as
the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
Taking the common level of tariff agreed by all countries t* as given, we first find the
optimal patent breadth chosen by individual countries. From the proof of Proposition
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If every country implements maximum patent breadth (b=1), we know from the proof
of Proposition 3 that utility is decreasing in the common level of tariff adopted.35
Therefore it is never optimal for countries to agree on a tariff level higher than T.
For tariff levels  t*<T, optimal patent breadth is given by (A55) and hence the
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Hence utility is independent of tariff and the same as the non-cooperative equilibrium.36
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